I. INTRODUCTION
The conflict between modern neoclassical and traditional Keynesian theories of the business cycle centers upon the pricing mechanism.' In neoclassical models, prices are fully flexible. They represent the continuous optimization of economic agents and the continuous intersection of supply and demand. In Keynesian models, prices are often assumed to be sticky. They do not necessarily equilibrate all markets at all times. One of the reasons for the resurgence of the equilibrium approach to macroeconomics has been the absence of a theoretical underpinning for this Keynesian price stickiness.
This note shows that sticky prices can be both privately efficient and socially inefficient. The business cycle results from the suboptimal adjustment of prices in response to a demand shock. To the extent that policy can stabilize aggregate demand, it can mitigate the social loss due to this suboptimal adjustment.
In some Keynesian models, prices are simply exogenously fixed.2 In others, agents must set their prices in advance of the transaction date.' The act of altering a posted price is certainly costly. These costs include such items as printing new catalogs and informing salesmen of the new price. Yet these "menu" costs are small and, therefore, generally perceived as providing only a weak foundation for these fixed-price models. However, this inference is flawed. Small menu costs can cause large welfare losses. The claim that price adjustment costs are small does not rebut the claim that they are central to understanding economic fluctuations. Proposition 2 suggests the downward price rigidity often mentioned in macroeconomic debate. The inefficiency results because there is an external benefit of C + A in printing new menus. How large is this externality? A natural measure is the ratio of the social benefit from a price adjustment B + C to the private benefit B -A. This ratio, of course, depends upon the size of the demand shock. Since the firm would adjust to the profit-maximizing price PM, rather than the first-best price k, the increment to profits B -A is of second order, while the increment to welfare B + C is of first order. Therefore, this ratio approaches infinity as the size of the shock approaches zero. The ratio is more meaningful if evaluated for a shock of typical size. Hence, I compute it for a 1 percent contraction.8 If the demand function has a constant price elasticity of ten, the ratio is twenty-three. If the elasticity is two, the ratio is over two hundred. For any plausible demand function, the social gains from price adjustment far exceed the private gains. 
III. CONCLUSION
The economy I describe is Keynesian, even though all agents are optimizing and all prices result from that optimization. The central postulate is that a monopoly firm must incur a small menu cost if it alters its posted price after an aggregate demand shock. I show that the firm's price adjustment decisions are suboptimal. In addition, the welfare loss can far exceed the menu cost that is its cause.
The model also displays an asymmetry between contractions and expansions, since the natural rate of output is below the social optimum. Private incentives produce too much price adjustment following an expansion in aggregate demand and too little price adjustment following a contraction in aggregate demand. From the viewpoint of a social planner, the nominal price level may be "stuck" too high, but it is never "stuck" too low. In this sense, prices are downwardly rigid but not upwardly rigid.9 Furthermore, the model's asymmetry parallels another observed phenomenon; namely, that while aggregate demand contractions are associated with grotesquely inefficient underproduction, aggregate demand expansions are not associated with similarly inefficient overproduction. There is no obverse to the Great Depression. Instead, periods of expansion, such as the late 1960s in the United States, are often considered periods of economic prosperity.10
The analysis presented here is all in the context of partial equilibrium. It is, however, possible to construct simple general equilibrium examples that encompass exactly these partial-equilibrium results.1" I suspect that a more complete general equilibrium model would exhibit more pronounced price stickiness. In particular, the introduction of interfirm purchases would exacerbate price rigidity. In such a model the failure of one firm to reduce its price following a contraction in demand would prevent the costs of other firms from falling, thereby reducing those firms' incentive to cut prices. The primary qualitative conclusion-that trivial menu costs can have important efficiency effects-would certainly remain true in the context of general equilibrium.12
The theme of this paper appears robust: In almost all economic models, agents who have the power to affect prices, exert that power by restricting output. The economy's equilibrium, or 13. Okun [1981, p. 267] , in his already well-known Prices and Quantities, writes that "there are strong grounds for the presumption that in macro equilibrium the output of the price-tag economy is below a social optimum, and that the extra output generated by a strengthening of aggregate demand augments social welfare."
14. See Blinder and Mankiw [1984] for a more complete exposition of this issue.
